Composition of the Board

Zaza Tavadze – Chairman of the Hearing;

Otar Sichinava – Member;

Tamaz Tsabutashvili – Member, judge rapporteur;

Lali Papiashvili - Member.

Secretary of the Hearing: Darejan Chaligava

Title of the Case: ThePublic Defender of Georgia v. the Parliament of Georgia.

Subject of the Dispute: Constitutionality of words “under the investigation” of subparagraph “b” of article 17 of the Law of Georgia “On Public Service” with respect to paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 29 of the Constitution of Georgia.

Participants of the Hearing: Representatives of the Claimant, the Public Defender of Georgia – Sopio Asatiani and Giorgi Burjanadze; Representative of the Parliament of Georgia – Zurab Matcharadze.

I
Descriptive Part

1. On January 22, 2014 a constitutional claim (registration N572) was lodged to the Constitutional Court of Georgia by the Public Defender of Georgia. On January 23, 2014 the Constitutional Complaint N572 was assigned to the Second Board of the Constitutional Court of Georgia for ruling on admission of the case for consideration on merits.

2. Preliminary session of the Second Board of the Constitutional Court without oral hearing was held on May 22, 2014 for ruling on admission of the case for consideration on merits. Pursuant to the Recording Notice N2/2/572 dated May 22, 2014 of the Second Board of the Constitutional Court the Constitutional Claim N572 was admitted for consideration on merits.

3. The oral hearing on merits by the Second Board of the Constitutional Court was held December 24, 2014.

4. According to the Constitutional Complaint N572 the legal basis for submission of the claim is paragraph 1 of article 89 of the Constitution of Georgia, subparagraph “e” of paragraph 1 of article 19, paragraph 1 of article 39 of the organic law of Georgia “On the Constitutional Court of Georgia”, paragraph 2 of article 1 of the Law of Georgia “On Constitutional Legal Proceedings” and subparagraph “i” of article 21 of the organic law of Georgia “On Public Defender”.

5. According to the disputed words of subparagraph “b” of paragraph 1 of article 17 of the Law of Georgia “On Public Service” a person which is under the investigation shall not be accepted into the public service.

6. According to paragraph 1 of article 29 of the Constitution of Georgia “Every citizen of Georgia shall have the right to hold any public office if they meet the requirements established by law." According to paragraph 2 of the same article “The requirements for state service shall be defined by Law.”

7. It is indicated in the Constitutional Claim that while regulating the public service, the State has wide discretion. However the limitation of exercising the right established by article 29 of the Constitution should be based on a rational basis. According to the Claimant although this constitutional provision entrusts the legislator to define the conditions for public service, legislator cannot have full liberty in regulating this field. Any regulation should be in conformity with the material criterion of limitation of article 29 of the Constitution.

8. According to the Constitutional Claim the stage of investigation in the criminal procedures comprises of gathering evidence; this does not have a specific addressee and is oriented on mere gathering the information, thus, it is impossible to exactly define the persons falling within the scope of the regulation of disputed provision.

9. For demonstrating the vagueness of the provision the Claimant indicates historical definition of the provision, specifically the Criminal Procedure Code of 1998 and states that subparagraph “b” of article 17 of the Law of Georgia “On Public Service” with the version existing today has been established by the law of September 24, 2010, before that the provision was of the following content: “is under the preliminary investigation or detention”. The Claimant notes that during the preliminary investigation a person, who had committed the crime, could have been a suspect or accused, however other subjects of the proceeding were also participating in the preliminary investigation.

10. As provided by the Claimant, since the Criminal Procedure Code of 2009 was adopted, the preliminary investigation stage was removed and, therefore subparagraph “b” of article 17 of the Law of Georgia “On Public Service” was also amended and the current version was established. The latter is so vague that any person can fall within the scope of the limitation, including a witness and a victim, towards whom the investigation can have questions.

11. As a result of complete analysis of old as well as new Criminal Procedure Code the Claimant considers that persons, who are under the criminal prosecution, accused, according the current Criminal Procedure Code, should be understood under the term “is under the investigation”. However the Constitutional Claim indicates that due to the vagueness of the disputed provision, other persons can be envisaged by it too. Therefore according to the Public Defender there a vagueness of restrictive provision is at face, which can be resulted into the unconstitutional regulation and increase arbitrariness of law enforcer. The Claimant considers that the above mentioned taken separately is enough to consider the disputed provision unconstitutional, since it contradicts to the formal requirement, to prescribe restrictions by law, of paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 29. The mentioned approach is specified and elaborated on by the practice of the Constructional Court regarding the requirement of the “quality of the law”.

12. The representative of the Public Defender additionally states that prohibition on holding an office or dismissal from the office for the accused generally is acceptable when there is such necessity. Specifically when there is an objective aim and it envisages avoidance of obstruction of justice.

13. According to the Claimant the regulation prescribed by the disputed provision is not the least restricting measure and the legitimate aim can be achieved through less limiting provision. The Claimant indicates that in this instance there is a blanket prohibition, according to which the accused automatically loses the possibility to be hired in the public service. By the definition of the Public Defender the old and current Criminal Procedure Codes allow temporary dismissal or removal of the accused from the office, so that he/she does not obstruct the justice. According to the Claimant articles 159 and 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code provide for this exact procedural measure. Pursuant to it possible to prohibit relevant person from conducting the work according to the rules provided by law. Alternatively, according to the Claimant the accused may face restriction on holding an office only in the event when he or she is arrested, since this is mandated by the interests of public service, derived from the fact that a person will be unable to carry out his/her duties. Derived from above mentioned the Claimant concludes that the legitimate aim could have been achieved through less restricting measures.

14. Pursuant to the Claimant when evaluating the constitutionality of the disputed provision the intensity of the restriction should be taken into account. Specifically, the duration of investigation on the criminal case is beyond the control of the accused. According to article 103 of the Criminal Procedure Code investigation is conducted within reasonable period, however not longer than the statute of limitation for the prosecution of crime established by the Criminal Code. This period can be prolonged for a lifetime and in some instances infinitely, since some crimes do not have statute of limitation. Therefore, according to the Claimant the accused can face the limitation of the right guaranteed by article 29 of the Constitution indefinitely.

15. According to the Constitutional Claim the judgment of conviction can be the basis for dismissal from the office in only two instances. Specifically if a person is convicted for intentional crime or the sanction excludes continuation of work. Based on this, blanket prohibition for the accused to hold an office is unjustified for the Claimant, when in specific cases a convicted person can continue working.

16. Based on all above mentioned the Claimant considers that the disputed provision contradicts paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 29 of the Constitution of Georgia.

17. During the hearing on merits the Respondent stated that unlike the private sector the legislator is required to establish much higher conditions and standards for the public sector. At the same time the accused is a person towards whom there is a probable cause of a criminal conduct. Therefore considering the functions of public sector, its relevance, the limitation established by the disputed provision is justified by the goals of public service.

18. The representative of the Respondent stated that the term “under the investigation” envisages only the accused. Regarding the vagueness of the provision the Respondent states that it is sufficiently foreseeable and possible incorrect use of the provision in the practice cannot make it unconstitutional.

19. According to the Respondent the disputed provision serves achievement of two legitimate aims – ensuring the stability of public service and avoidance of influencing the investigation.

20. The Respondent stated that considering the specific nature of public service it is relevant that a public officer holds the office in a stable manner. With regards to the persons envisaged by the disputed provision there is a probable cause that the judgment of conviction will be rendered, which in turn is the basis for dismissal.

21. According to the Respondent, even in the instances when a person is accused of committing a crime, convicting of which is not the basis for dismissal, the necessity to protect the stability of public service still exists, since the qualification of the crime might change.

22. The Respondent defines that by being hired in the public service an accused may hinder the efficient investigation, destroy evidences and use the influence. According to the Respondent investigating a crime is a positive duty of the State and in order to protect this interest the legislator is authorised to establish certain limitations regarding holding a public office.

23. Based on the provided arguments the Respondent does not agree with the Claim and considers that the disputed provisions are in full conformity with the standards for interference with article 29 of the Constitution of Georgia.

II
Reasoning Part

1. According to the Constitutional Court “Democracy, which literally means governance of people, naturally entails peoples’ right to take part in the formation of the government, as well as execution of governance” (Judgement №3/2/574 of the Constitutional Court of Georgia dated May 23, 2014 on the case of “Citizen of Georgia Giorgi Ugulava v. the Parliament of Georgia”, II-9). Right to work in the state establishments is a specific form of labour relationships, which, on the one hand is one of the ways of professional self-realisation and, on the other hand, provides a citizen with a possibility to be directly involved in state governance, which includes among other things making decisions and enforcing them in the name of the State. Thus the right protected under article 29 of the Constitution of Georgia is an expression of democratic state, which “fortifies the right of a citizen of Georgia, to hold both elective and appointive positions and determines the constitutional grounds for the exercise of public office. Besides, the given provision of the constitution contains not only the guarantees for holding specific positions, but also the guarantees for unhindered exercise of official duties and for ungrounded dismissal from the office” (Judgement of the Constitutional Court of Georgia No. 1/2/569 dated April 11, 2014 on the case of “Citizens of Georgia Davit Kandelaki, Natalia Dvali, Zurab Davitashvili, Emzar Goguadze, Giorgi Meladze and Mamuka Pachuashvili v. The Parliament of Georgia, II-1).

2. Article 29 of the Constitution of Georgia includes, among others, the right of a person to hold any state post. The disputed provision prohibits hiring a person “under the investigation” to a public service. It therefore constitutes a restriction of the right protected by article 29 of the Constitution.

3. The State is entitled to establish conditions for entering the public service, which can include restriction on holding an office; however, interference with the right recognised by article 29 of the Constitution should be in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution. The magnitude of the restriction prescribed by the disputed provision is substantially dependent on which categories of persons it addresses, based on what criteria and to what intensity the possibility to work at public service is prohibited. Therefore in order to correctly assess the constitutionality of the disputed provision the volume of restriction and the circle of persons who are prohibited from taking a public office should be established.

4. Georgian law does not define the term of a person under the investigation, while the correct legal interpretation demands establishing the essence and the aim of the provision. Therefore, the content of the disputed provision should be established by word-by-word and systemic analysis in the context of the law “On Public Service” and generally the law regulating investigation procedures. “...the disputed norms shall not be considered separately from other related norms, because such approach may lead the Constitutional Court to wrong conclusions” (Judgement of the Constitutional Court of Georgia No. 2/2-389 dated October 26, 2007 on the case of “Citizen of Georgia Maia Natadze and others v. The Parliament and the President of Georgia, II-6).

5. Pursuant to subparagraph “b” of article 17 of the Law of Georgia “On Public Service” a person that is under the investigation or is detained shall not be accepted in the public service. According to the Constitutional Claim only the words “under the investigation or” are disputed. Therefore detained persons do not fall within the prohibition. Thus within the instant case the Constitutional Court will not assess the constitutionality of prohibition to hold an office for the accused that are detained.

6. According to the Claimant the investigation is held regarding the criminal act not a person. The Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia (hereinafter CPCG) prescribes prosecution for an identified person, not the investigation. Therefore the disputed provision is too vague and creates the possibility of prohibition not only towards the accused but also other participants of the criminal procedure (witness, victim, expert, etc.). According to the Claimant the mentioned regulation is a result of comprehended legislative act (and not a legal error), since the disputed provision was amended after the Criminal Procedure Code (of October 9, 2009) was adopted, however the legislator did not tailor the formulation to the synonym of “accused”.

7. The Respondent agreed with the Claimant that the term is not a legal error, however according to the Respondent only the accused is envisaged within the term “under the investigation”.

8. According to paragraph 19 of article 3 of the CPCG the accused is “a person against whom there is a probable cause suggesting that he/she has committed an offence provided for by the Criminal Code of Georgia”. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of article 169 “the grounds for the indictment of a person shall be the body of evidence that is sufficient to establish probable cause that the person has committed a crime.” Probable cause is sufficient for prosecuting a person, however according to paragraph 13 of article 3 to pass a judgment of conviction a higher, beyond reasonable doubt evidentiary standard is required, which is a totality of evidence which would convince an objective person of the culpability of the person. After a person is indicted the gathering of evidence regarding the possible criminal fact committed by him/her continues. Therefore the term “is under the investigation” indisputably envisages the accused. At the same time it is relevant to verify how correct the Respondent’s position, according to which the term “is under the investigation” only envisages the accused, is.

9. The Criminal Procedure Code of October 9, 2009 (LHG, 31, 03/11/2009) has replaced the Criminal Procedure Code of February 20, 1998 (the Gazette of the Parliament of Georgia 13-14, 20/03/1998). During the effect of the latter pursuant to subparagraph “b” of article 17 of the Law of Georgia “On Public Service” a person who was under “the preliminary investigation” could not be accepted in the public service. “The preliminary investigation” was an institution prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code of 1998. The Criminal Procedure Code of October 9, 2009 does not acknowledge “preliminary investigation”, it recognises the “investigation”, therefore after adopting the mentioned Act, pursuant to article 32 of the Law of Goergia “On Amendments and Additions to Some Legal Acts of Georgia” (LHG, 51, 29/09/2010) subparagraph “b” of article 17 of the Law of Georgia “On Public Service” was established with the following version: “is under the investigation or is detained”. October 1, 2010 was prescribed for the entry into force for this provision which indicates that the amendment made into article 17 of the Law of Georgia “On Public Service” was caused by the entry into force of the new Criminal Procedure Code. The legislator established the prohibition for entrance in the public service for a person that is under the investigation and not for an accused. Therefore nothing indicates that a person considered by the disputed provision as one under the investigation and an accused should be seen as the terms of same content. Derived from the above mentioned establishing who apart from the accused can be envisaged as a person under the investigation should be made by analysis of relevant CPCG provisions.

10. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of article 3 of the CPCG investigation is “a combination of actions taken under this Code by an authorised person for the purpose of collecting evidence relating to an offence”. Derived from articles 100 and 101 of the same Code investigation is commenced after the information regarding a criminal offence is received by the investigative body. For conducting an investigation existence of criminal fact and/or information thereof should be present, and the investigation envisages gathering evidences regarding this fact. The aim of investigation is identification of possible offender, gathering relevant (sufficient for establishing probable cause) evidences regarding a specific person to commence his/her prosecution. During the investigation and criminal prosecution while conducting different investigative and/or procedural actions certain persons can be revealed, towards whom the investigative body may have the suspicion (but not probable cause) of the offence. There also can be evidences substantiating such suspicion and to verify it the investigative body might conduct certain investigative measures. Derived from the mentioned, apart from the accused, other people, towards whom certain investigative measures are conducted, can also fall within the regulation of the disputed provision. Therefore it is obvious that within the reasonable definition of the disputed provision the prohibition may cover not only the accused but also other persons, who do not have the status of an accused, but certain investigative measures are conducted towards them. Thus when verifying the constitutionality of the disputed provision this normative content should be taken into consideration.

11. According to paragraph 1 of article 29 of the Constitution of Georgia, every citizen of Georgia shall have the right to hold any public office if they meet the requirements established by law. The Constitutional Court has multiple times stated that the Rule of Law principle is inseparable art of constitutional order, which “puts State, including the legislative branch within strict constitutional law frames of action” (Judgement of the Constitutional Court of Georgia No. 2/2-389 dated October 26, 2007 on the case of “Citizen of Georgia Maia Natadze and others v. The Parliament and the President of Georgia, II-18). The existence of Rule of Law State is unimaginable without protection of basic human rights and freedoms, which on their own are based on the idea of natural freedom of human and its arbitrary restriction is unacceptable. Any measure or law limiting the right should be in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution, both in formal and material manner. Similarly the law regulating the realisation of right to hold a public office should both formally and materially be consistent with the requirements of the Constitution.

12. In the instant case the Court should evaluate how far the disputed provision protects the material standards of limitation established by the Constitution of Georgia, which firstly envisages establishing the aim of the disputed provision. The State is obliged to demonstrate that the law restriction the right serves achievement of valuable legitimate aim. According to the definition of the Constitutional Court “Only the constitutionality of the means of attaining a legitimate aim can be reviewed with the principle of proportionality” (Judgement of the Constitutional Court of Georgia No.1/2/411 dated December 19, 2008 on the case of “LTD “Russenergoservice”, LTD “Patara Kakhi”, JSC “Gorgota”, Givi Abalaki’s Individual Company “Farmer” and LTD “Energia” v. the Parliament of Georgia and the Ministry of Energy of Georgia”, II-9). “In the conditions of absence of the legitimate aim, any interference with the right of an individual has an arbitrary nature and the restriction of the right is utterly unjustified, unconstitutional” (Judgement of the Constitutional Court of Georgia No.3/1/531 dated November 5, 2013 on the case of “Citizens of Israel – Tamaz Janashvili, Nana Janashvili and Irma Janashvili v. the Parliament of Georgia”, II-15).

13. According to the Respondent the disputed provision serves the interests of the justice, specifically the person under investigation might hinder the investigation, abuse the office, influence process of evidence gathering. The representative of the Parliament of Georgia also indicates that the aim of the disputed provision is ensuring the stability of public service. Specifically, avoidance of rapid changes of the public officers, which supports due functioning of public service. Since demonstrating constitutionality of the disputed provision by the Respondent is based on two independent legitimate aims, the Court will evaluate each of them and their connection with the restriction separately using the principle of proportionality.

14. Realising the Criminal Justice would be impossible without due investigation. Investigative bodies should not face unjustified impediments in gathering evidences. “It is indubitable that effective fight against crime and due execution of justice is one of the primary tasks of the State. Unhindered investigation of criminal cases, ensuring compensation of damage caused as a result of the offense and prevention of future crimes are public interests of utmost importance” (Judgement №3/2/574 of the Constitutional Court of Georgia dated May 23, 2014 on the case of “Citizen of Georgia Giorgi Ugulava v. the Parliament of Georgia”, II-26).

15. In the event when there is connection between the office to be held and the investigation towards a person, the latter might have the opportunity to somehow influence the investigation, if his/her position is linked with obtaining relevant evidences for the offence probably committed by him/her. The Constitutional Court does not exclude that in specific cases removing a person from its specific position, limiting the right to hold the office or to exercise authorities may even be necessary for conducting due investigation.

16. The Constitutional Court holds that due to risk of influencing the investigation the right to hold the office may be limited as a result of evaluating specific circumstances of the criminal case. Specifically authorised body should establish objective contextual connection between the office and the action attributed to a person. At the same time, there need to be circumstances that demonstrate the reality of the threat to destroy the evidences and/or influence the witnesses from a person.

17. Opposed to this the disputed provision does not link the restriction of holding the office to specific threats of hindering the investigation, but establishes blanket prohibition towards all persons under the investigation. Person’s job might not have any connection with investigation or implementing the justice, his or her functions might not allow for the possibility of access to relevant evidences/documents or derived from work hierarchy, personal characteristics of the accused and the nature of relationship with co-workers might exclude the reality of the danger to influence witnesses. Derived from this the disputed provision envisages wider restriction than necessary to achieve legitimate goal, it prohibits holding the office even when the interest of establishing justice on a criminal case does not demand it. Therefore the disputed provision is disproportionate measure to the legitimate aim of avoiding the obstruction of justice on a criminal case.

18. The Respondent also indicates towards the risk of court conviction of a person under the investigation, which according to the law of Georgia “On Public Service” is the basis of dismissal. Therefore towards these persons there is a threat that the legal duty of dismissal will emerge. Derived from this the Respondent considers that based on the aim of stability of public service persons under the investigation should not be appointed to the office.

19. The Constitutional Court recognises the relevance of stability of staff, however also defines that the stability of staff is not the end in itself and it does not envisage the efficiency of public service or the growth of competence. Stability of staff supports improvement of professionalism and competence in public service, however stability does not itself contain efficiency or the quality of services provided. The quality of work is primarily related to the education of an officer, his/her personal characteristics, good faith and responsible approach towards the duties, motivation of career growth, etc.

20. As a rule job experience supports professional growth and the efficiency of work; however in certain cases work performed by a person employed in public service, which has less job experience, due to the education or other professional skills might exceed that of an officer with larger job experience, but with less education and skills. Therefore in this instance the Court cannot a priori consider the provision the legitimate aim of which is stability of public service staff constitutional. It must be evaluated how just the condition to enter the office set by the disputed provision is and how far it enables the most suitable candidate to take it, which, in its turn is the precondition of efficient functioning of public service.

21. According to paragraph 1 of article 29 of the law of Georgia “On Public Service” “a person may be appointed to an office only through a competition, except as provided for in Article 30 of this Law.” According to articles 33, 34 and paragraph 1 of article 36¹, a permanent Competition and Certification Commission is established in the public establishment to ensure holding of competition and certification. The Commission among other things evaluates the compatibility of a candidate with the requirements for occupying the vacant position; if necessary it hears the opinion of the candidate eligible for the given position and nominates or refuses to nominate one of the candidates for appointment to the vacant position.

22. Derived from above mentioned pursuant to the law of Georgia “On Public Service” a person that is most compatible to the qualification requirements for the vacant position is appointed through the competition. The similar presumption operates with regard to appointing a person without a competition. The demand that the vacant position should be filled with a person that compared to other candidates has more professional experience/qualification and/or relevant specific skills for the position is established by the law. Therefore the disputed provision in fact prohibits appointing a person that is more qualified than other candidates, is most compatible with the competition conditions, has more skills and relevant job experience, but is under the investigation.

23. The Constitutional Court does not exclude that some state positions derived from their nature demand appointment of a person on a long-term basis. In such circumstances the ability of an officer to be able to certainly perform job functions for a long term might be the precondition/requirement for a specific vacant position. In such instances not appointing a person that is under the investigation might be justified. However this should be derived from the characteristic/specificity of a particular public office and should be related to the objective necessities.

24. The disputed provision does not leave the room for free action. Between the conflicting interests it gives unconditional priority to the stability of public service. Specifically the disputed provision provides limitation and prohibits accepting any person under the investigation to a public office. The right to hold an office for such persons are limited during the whole period of investigation, which can be longer than several months/years. Appointing a person under the investigation is prohibited even in the cases when a competition commission and/or a person authorised to appoint consider, derived from the specifications of the job, professional skills of a candidate, the lack of qualified personnel in the field or other reasons, that being under the investigation is not an impediment to hold the office.

25. A person authorised to select or appoint person on a position can define the job requirements and in each individual case make decision based on relevant circumstances, which interest is more valuable for the functions that need to be operated on a vacant position. The legality of job requirements in each specific case is subject to verification by the common courts. This system enables limiting the right to hold an office only in the instances when such necessity is real and objective, as opposed to blanket without assessing individual circumstances.

26. It should be taken into account that according to article 103 of the law of Georgia “On Public Service” the judgment of conviction is not a basis for dismissal if a person was convicted of a negligent crime and the punishment used does not hinder performing job duties (for instance is not related to restricting the freedom or the right to work or holding an office). It is unclear why the restriction of persons under the investigation provides for the stability of public service, when a judgment of conviction is not unconditionally the basis for dismissal.

27. Therefore it is clear that the legitimate aims provided by the Respondent can be achieved through less restrictive legal regulation, which would provide for prohibition of being appointed linking it to necessities of specific position and will not be blanket. The general limitation established by the disputed provision does not fulfil the requirements of principle of proportionality thus the words “under the investigation or” of subparagraph “b” of article 17 of the Law of Georgia “On Public Service” should be deemed unconstitutional with regards to paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 29 of the Constitution of Georgia.

III
Ruling part

Based on subparagraph “f” of the paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 of article 89 of the Constitution of Georgia, subparagraph “e” of paragraph 1 of article 19, paragraph 2 of article 21, paragraph 3 of article 25, subparagraph “b” of paragraph 1 of article 39, paragraphs 2, 4, 7 and 8 of article 43 of the organic law of Georgia “On The Constitutional Court of Georgia”, paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 7, paragraph 4 of article 24, articles 30, 31, 32 and 33 of the Law of Georgia “On Constitutional Legal Proceedings”

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
RULES:

1. The constitutional claim N572 (the Public Defender v. the Parliament of Georgia) shall be upheld and words “under the investigation or” of subparagraph “b” of article 17 of the Law of Georgia “On Public Service” shall be declared unconstitutional with respect to paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 29 of the Constitution of Georgia.

2. The unconstitutional provision shall be declared invalid from the moment of publishing this Judgment.

3. This judgment is in force from the moment of its public announcement on the hearing of the Constitutional Court.

4. The judgment is final and is not subject to appeal or review.

5. A copy of the judgment shall be sent to: the parties, the President, the Government and the Supreme Court of Georgia.

6. The judgment shall be published in the “Legislative Herald of Georgia” within the period of 15 days.

Composition of the board:

Zaza Tavadze

Lali Papiashvili

Tamaz Tsabutashvili

Otar Sichinava