Citizen of Georgia Oleg Latsabidze v. The Parliament of Georgia
Document Type | Judgment |
Document ID | N3/5/626 |
Chamber/Plenum | Plenum - Lali Fafiashvili, Maia Kopaleishvili, Zaza Tavadze, Tamaz Tsabutashvili, Merab Turava, Irine Imerlishvili, Giorgi Kverenchkhiladze, Teimuraz Tughushi, Manana Kobakhidze, |
Date | 17 October 2017 |
Publish Date | 17 October 2017 21:52 |
The abstract of the judgment (The judgment is available only in Georgian). Abstracts published by the Constitutional Court of Georgia summarise the facts of the case and key legal considerations of the judgment.
Abstract
on 17 October, 2017, the Constitutional Court adopted the Judgement in the case of “Citizen of Georgia, Oleg Latsabidze v. The Parliament of Georgia” (constitutional complaintc№626).
In this case, the subject of dispute was the constitutionality of the words “dismisses from the position” of Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 4 of the Article 60 of the Code of Local Self-Government (the version in force on 6 February, 2015) with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 29 of the Constitution of Georgia.
The complainant considered problematic the rule provided in the disputed provisions, which authorized a head of executive body of local government/mayor to dismiss without provision of reasons a head of a structural unit of the municipal office. On the other hand, according to the disputed rules, powers of a head of structural unit of a municipal office would automatically terminate from the moment of election (taking of office) of a new head of executive body of local government/mayor. The complainant stated, that it is possible to differentiate the standards for dismissal from the occupied position depending on whether a person is political or career official. At the same time, a head of the structural unit of a municipal office is a career official and the challenged regulation interferes in their right to work in the public office without impediment.
According to the explanation of the respondent, the Parliament of Georgia, the challenged rule served the goal of efficient administration of local self-government. Moreover, certain functions of a head of structural unit leads to application to them different rules of dismissal from their position, from what apply to other career officials. In addition to the above-mentioned, the respondent asserted, that the goal of above regulation was to ensure possibility to change the human resources in public offices after each elections.
The Constitutional Court pointed out, that public offices differ from each other in view of their nature. Therefore the constitutional standards should also differ depending on whether a given position has political or professional nature. Based on the relevant legislation, the Court decided, that a head of the structural unit of a municipal office is a career official. Moreover, the main requirement for professional position is official’s qualification, experience, personal skills and so forth. Therefore, for efficient functioning of the local self-government it is crucial to employ and maintain professional (career) personnel. Therefore, a rule, which allows for automatic termination of office of a respective official without review or evaluation of their qualifications, experience or other skills from the moment of taking of office by a new head of executive body of local government or mayor, constitutes an unjustified interference in the right to work in a public office enshrined in the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court did not share the argument of the respondent party with regard to the necessity of possibility to substitute the personnel after each election. The Court declared, that the presence of democracy implies in the first place government by the people, implementation of public powers by the people directly or through their elected representatives. At the same time, having a democratic state does not imply substitution of all public officials with the new personnel and members of the political group of newly elected public official after each election. Not only this is not required by democracy, but also it is at conflict with democracy as a matter of principle. Therefore the Court decided that it is not a Constitutional requirement to make available an actual opportunity to substitute the professional personnel after each election and it cannot serve as ground for limiting the requirements of Article 29(2) of the Constitution.
The Court noted with regard to the unreasoned dismissal of heads of structural units of municipal offices, that after the examination of the relevant circumstances of this case the legitimate aim of this restriction was not discerned and the rule was declared unconstitutional.
In view of the above-mentioned, the Constitutional Court upheld the constitutional complaint №626.